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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:

Case No. 890087-CA

:

ADDAM SWAPP,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment
entered against Defendant in Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Summit County, the Honorable Michael Murphy, Judge,
presiding.

On December 22, 1988, Defendant was found guilty by a

jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a second
degree felony, as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1990).
Sentence was imposed on January 26, 1989.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's

Motion For Bill of Particulars?
The standard of review is whether the trial court
abused its discretion.
449 (1948).

State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d

Should the Court find error, the standard of review
would be the harmless error standard of Rule 30 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

The standard would be whether, absent the

error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more
favorable to the accused, that is, whether the Court's confidence
in the outcome of the trial is eroded.

The Defendant bears the

burden of making a credible argument that his defense was
impaired by the error.

If he does so, the State then bears the

burden of persuasion that such error was harmless under Rule 30.
State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988).
2.

Did the trial court err in interpreting §76-3-

401(4) to permit sentencing Defendant to one to fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison to run consecutively to his federal
sentences, with the limitation that the aggregate maximum of both
state and federal sentences could not exceed thirty years?
The standard of review applicable to interpretation of
law is that the Court accords the trial court's conclusions of
law no particular deference but reviews them for correctness.
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); City of
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah:
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right . . . to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him [and] to have a copy thereof. . . .
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:

(e) When facts not set out in an
information or indictment are required to
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of
the offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a
written motion for a bill of particulars...
The request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement
of factual information needed to set forth
the essential elements of the particular
offense charged.
Criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202
(1990):
Every person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.
Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations, Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) (1978) (amended 1989):
(4) If a court lawfully determined to
impose consecutive sentences, the aggregate
minimum of all sentences imposed may not
exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the
aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed
may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment...
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990):
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, he engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to

another and thereby causes the death of
another; or.••
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. §76-5205(1) (1990):
Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme emotion disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse; or
(c)causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, his brother Jonathan Swapp, and John
Timothy Singer were charged with one count of Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5203 (1990) (R. 2-5). Trial commenced on November 25, 1988, in
Summit County, Utah (R. 746). The jury returned its verdicts on
December 22, 1988 (R. 990-993).

Defendant and John Timothy

Singer were convicted of the lesser and included offense of
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-205 (1990) (R. 1092, 1094).

Jonathan Swapp was convicted

of Negligent Homicide, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206
(1990) (R. 1093).

On January 26, 1989, the Defendant was

sentenced to a term of not less than one year nor more than 15
years in the Utah State Prison, said term to run consecutively to
and at the end of any and all determinate sentences imposed in

United States v. Addam W. Swapp, Case No. 88-CR-006J, United
States District Court for the District of Utah, with the
limitation that, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4)
(1978) (amended 1989), the aggregate maximum term of all
sentences imposed in the instant case and the federal case in no
event exceed thirty (30) years (R. 1422-1426).

John Timothy

Singer was also sentenced to 1-15 years in prison, to be served
consecutively to his federal sentence (R. 1417-1421).

Jonathan

Swapp was sentenced for the Class A misdemeanor offense of
Negligent Homicide to one year in jail consecutive to his federal
sentence (R. 1427-1431).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of January 16, 1988, Max
Lewis, who resided across the street from the Marion Stake
Center, in Marion, Utah, was awakened by a loud noise and the
shaking of his house (Tr. 12-2, pp. 88) .

Later that morning,

when he went to the parking lot of the Stake Center to plow snow,
Lewis noticed that the building had been severely damaged (Tr.
12-2, pp. 88-89).

Detective Robert Berry of the Summit County

Sheriff's Office responded to the scene and located a large
carved pole that had been wired to a fence on the east side of
the Stake Center.

The pole had been painted red and bore an

inscription (Tr. 12-2, pp. 95-96).
Near the pole, Detective Berry observed a trail in the
snow.

It consisted of several footprints proceeding in an east-

west direction.

He followed the trail through a field and

Transcript references refer to the date the evidence was taken.

ultimately to the property occupied by the extended family of
Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-2, pp. 96-97).

Officers did not enter that

Singer property (Tr. 12-2, p. 103). This was because several
months earlier, on October 29, 1987, Summit County Sheriff Fred
Ely had been ordered off the property by Defendant Addam Swapp,
who had pointed handguns in the direction of the sheriff and a
deputy, and fired a shot into the air as the officers were
leaving, warning them not to come onto the property again (Tr.
12-2, pp. 120-123).

On the same day, Deputy Joe Offret of the

Summit County Sheriff's Office contacted Defendant by phone, who
reiterated his earlier warning, stating that if officers came on
to the property blood would be spilled and it wouldn't be his
(Tr. 12-2, 138-141).
After Detective Berry followed the footprints to the
Singer property, federal authorities were contacted (Tr. 12-2,
pp. 102-103).

F.B.I. Agent Calvin Clegg was able to make

telephonic contact with the Defendant, who did not deny his
involvement in the bombing.

Defendant quoted extensively from

scripture and indicated that his God was angry, stating that the
scriptures were replete with references that God would pour out
his wrath against the people who strike out against the Church of
God (Tr. 12-2, PP. 156-157).

Clegg informed Defendant that the

property was surrounded and that law enforcement wanted a
peaceful solution (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Clegg told Defendant he
was concerned about the children (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Defendant
told Clegg that he had expected the confrontation and that the
family was prepared for a siege and could hold out for months

(Tr. 12-2, p. 158). After a 19-minute discussion, Defendant
terminated the conversation (Tr. 12-2, pp. 158-159).
The day after the bombing, Defendant telephoned Chad
Gibbs, a news reporter for KUTV news in Salt Lake City.
Defendant acknowledged he had left at the site of the bombing a
red pole which included the inscription "Church, state and nation
shall now be destroyed" (Tr. 12-2, pp. 203-205).

In his prepared

statement, Defendant made scriptural references to the Lord
fighting their battles and the sword falling on their enemies
(Tr. 12-2, p. 208).
Over the ensuing thirteen days numerous federal law
enforcement agents were assigned to the standoff at Marion, Utah.
Due to the presence of a number of young children (Exhibit P-19),
strict rules of engagement were imposed upon the officers. Under
no circumstances was the Singer residence to be fired upon, even
if officers themselves were under fire from the house (Tr. 12-2,
pp. 234-235).
At various times throughout the standoff, law
enforcement authorities set up lights and played loud noises
through speaker systems.

The speakers were not used until

approximately one week into the standoff (Tr. 12-5, p. 98; Tr.
12-14, p. 219). The placement of the lights and speakers was
undertaken at the suggestion of Duane Fuselier, an FBI Agent and
psychologist who was brought to the scene to help bring a
peaceful end to the crisis. He suggested the use of the lights
for security and tactical reasons, and felt the noise would be a
way of prodding the family to at least communicate with the
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 97-98).

Throughout the standoff, Defendant and Jonathan Swapp
openly carried firearms when they were outside the residence
(Tr. 12-5, pp. 7-8, 26-28, 30-31, 39-47) (Exhibits 12 to 19).
Firearms were discharged from the Singer property on numerous
occasions.

Several times rounds were fired from the Singer

residence and elsewhere at lights, generators and other equipment
set up to assist in the effort to bring the standoff to an end.
At times, shots were fired at positions occupied by federal
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 8-9, 15-16; Tr. 12-2, 248-249, Tr. 12-7,
235-236).

On two occasions, Jonathan Swapp pointed his rifle in

the direction of FBI agents (Tr. 12-2, p. 251; Tr. 12-5, p. 47).
On one occasion, an F.B.I, agent observed John Timothy Singer
outside the back door of the Singer house in his wheelchair in
possession of a rifle (Tr. 12-5, p. 44).
Authorities continued to try to negotiate with the
occupants of the property.

On January 20, 1988, a letter from

the ATF Special Agent in charge, Nolan Douglas, was dropped onto
the property from a helicopter (Tr. 12-2, pp. 219-220).

The

letter stated that Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer had been
indicted by a federal grand jury, that arrest warrants were
outstanding for the two, and that a federal judge had ordered
them to immediately come out.

Douglas expressed concern for the

family, especially the children, and encouraged the family to
pick up the telephone and talk to work the situation out
peacefully (Exhibit C-2).

The family gave no response to

Douglas' letter (Tr. 12-14, p. 228).

On January 25, 1988, Odgen Kraut, a friend of the
Singer family, was allowed onto the property to act as an
intermediary (Tr. 12-5, pp. 231-234).
occasions.

He went in on three

On his first visit, Kraut asked Defendant Addam Swapp

why he had guns, and if he intended to shoot anyone.

Defendant

responded, "No, not unless they come over the fence."

He told

Kraut that part of his revelation was that there would be a
confrontation and bloodshed there (Tr. 12-5, p. 242), and that
the family was expecting John Singer to be resurrected from the
dead as a result of the confrontation with the authorities (Tr.
12-5, p. 239).
The following day, on January 26, 1988, ten days into
the standoff, the authorities had Kraut deliver a letter from
Utah Governor Norman Bangerter to the family, urging the
occupants to peacefully end the standoff, if only for the sake of
the small children who were inside the Singer residence with
Defendant Swapp (Exhibit C-8).

Kraut described Addam as being

armed like a "Mexican bandito" with a band of bullets across his
chest and waist, a pistol on each side, a long knife and a rifle.
Kraut told Defendant it was not his mission to make war (Tr. 125, p. 251).

Kraut returned the next day, January 27, 1988, and

was given handwritten letters to the Governor from Defendant
Addam Swapp and from Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-5, pp. 260-262).

On

either his second or third visit, Kraut told Defendant that he
would "either have a big revelation up here or a catastrophe," to
which Defendant responded, "That's right." (Tr. 12-5, p. 253)

In his letter to the Governor, Defendant stated that he
did not recognize the authority of the government, and declared
the Singer property an independent nation.

He commanded law

enforcement to leave the valley immediately, threatening
destruction in the name of the Lord.
he stated:

In the P.S. to the letter

"TAKE A WARNING - any man of yours who attempts to

cross the Boundaries of this place, without our Permission, will
be treated as an agressive (sic) act on your part against us and
we will defend ourselves in any manner we see fit. . . . "
(Exhibit C-9, page 6) (Tr. 12-5, pp. 114-120).
Discouraged by the letters they received, officers
decided to attempt an arrest.

Their belief was that Defendant

was the leader on the property (Tr. 12-5, p. 141), and that if he
was captured, the other family members would surrender and the
standoff would end, which proved prophetic (Tr. 12-5, pp. 123125; Tr. 12-14, p. 274-275).
The first arrest plan involved the use of the noise
producing speakers as decoys.

The agents were aware that when

noise had previously been broadcast, the Swapp brothers would
venture off the property and disable the speakers by firing into
them.

Members of the FBI Hostage Rescue Team and Utah State

Corrections Department dog handlers would be in the area when the
Swapp brothers left the property.

The dogs would be released and

take down the Swapp brothers (Tr. 12-5, p. 289-292).

When the

speakers were activated the Swapp brothers did respond as
anticipated (Tr. 12-5, pp. 298-299).

However, when the dogs were

released they did not attack the Swapp brothers.

One of the dogs

began to attack one of the agents, the other ran a few yards and
returned to his handler.

After disabling the speakers by

shooting them with firearms, the Swapps retreated to the Singer
house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 232-233, 251).
In conjunction with this first plan, several F.B.I,
agents assigned to the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Corrections
dog handler Fred House had entered the house on the west side of
the Singer property, known as the Bates house, at about 10:00
p.m. on January 27 (Tr. 12-7, pp. 9-10).

Agents had previously

observed family members, including the Swapp brothers, enter the
house during the previous twelve days.

In the event that the

Swapp brothers entered the Bates house on the morning of the
28th, agents would be in a position to effect an arrest (Tr. 125, pp. 291).
When the first arrest attempt failed, a second plan was
put into effect.

The agents were aware that the Swapp brothers

went to milk the family goat every morning.

The goat pen was

located approximately one-half way between the Bates and Singer
houses.

The new plan was to release the dogs from the front door

of the Bates house as the Swapp brothers left the goat pen.

The

dogs were to take the Swapps to the ground, after which the
officers would move in and effect the arrest without the
necessity of firing a shot (Tr. 12-6, pp. 37, 41).
At about 8:30 a.m. on January 28, 1988, Defendant and
Jonathan Swapp left the Singer house to milk the goat. As usual,
both were armed.

Utah Department of Corrections dog handlers

Jerry Pope and Fred House moved to the front door of the Bates

house when the Swapp brothers approached the goat pen (Tr. 12-6,
vol II, p. 76). After they finished the milking, they began
walking from the goat pen located midway between the Bates home
and the Singer house towards the Singer house.
opened and the dogs were released.

The door was

At that time, F.B.I, agents

John Butler and Martin Brown were positioned behind Pope and
House to provide cover (Tr. 12-7, p. 150-151).

Butler and Brown

were armed with 9mm rifles (Tr. 12-7, p. 134). Agents David
Edward and Richard Intellini, also armed, were lying prone on a
second floor landing of the Bates house looking out a window that
faced the Singer house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 22-24).
As the dogs were released, Lt. House was crouched
slightly in the doorway with his right side exposed to the Singer
house (Tr. 12-7, p. 184). Shortly after the dogs were released,
gunfire erupted from the Singer house. A volley of three shots
was fired (Exhibit E-4).

Almost simultaneously, agents in the

Bates house observed Defendant Addam Swapp pull his 30-06 rifle
off his shoulder, spin around to face the Bates house, and bring
his rifle into a firing position.

Agents Butler and Intellini

each fired one shot almost simultaneously at Defendant Swapp, who
fell to the ground (Tr. 12-7, pp. 156-160; Tr. 12-6, p. 94; Tr.
12-7, p. 29). Agent Butler's round entered Defendant's wrist,
traveled through his arm into his chest and lodged in his back
(Tr. 12-14, pp. 86-90).

Agent Intellini's round struck the

inside of a window frame in the Bates house (Tr. 12-6, p. 95).
After firing his shot, Agent Butler grabbed Pope and pulled him
into the stairwell (Tr. 12-7, p. 160).

Just after the agents fired, a series of four and then
three rounds (Exhibit E-4) were fired from the Singer house and
the northeast corner of the house.

Just before the last volley,

FBI Agent Hal Metcalf, who was looking out a window in the Jepsen
home to the west of the Bates house, saw Jonathan Swapp kneeling
at the northeast corner of the Singer house, pointing a rifle in
his direction.

Agent Metcalf dove for cover as rounds hit the

Jepsen home (Tr. 12-7, p. 205; Tr. 12-8, p. 17).
Shortly after the gunfire erupted, agents noticed that
Fred House had been hit and had slumped to the ground (Tr. 12-6,
vol. II, p. 37). Agent Intellini called out to him to hold on,
that they'd get him out of there (Tr. 12-6, p. 96). The dogs,
who had become disoriented and apparently never keyed on the
Swapp brothers, re-entered the Bates house as Agent Hugh McKinney
made his way down the stairs to give House first aid (Tr. 12-7,
pp. 29-30).

About that same time more shots were hitting the

partially open front door (Tr. 12-7, pp. 99-100).

Lt. House had

slumped back into a closet near the doorway with his feet
blocking the doorway (Tr. 12-7, p. 162). While making his way to
Lt. House, McKinney, lying prone, heard the snap of bullets
passing over his head (Tr. 12-7, P. 113). McKinney managed to
pull Lt. House's feet from in front of the door and Butler was
able to close it with the handle of a mop (Tr. 12-7, p. 100).
Once the door was closed no more rounds entered the Bates house.
McKinney administered first aid to Lt. House, but he did not
respond (Tr. 12-7, pp. 101-102).

After the shooting stopped, Defendant, who was wounded
and had retreated into the Singer house, was observed approaching
the Bates house unarmed (Tr. 12-7, pp. 241-242).

Agents ordered

him to lie on the ground where he was given medical attention
(Tr. 12-7, pp. 264-270, 171-172).

At about the same time,

armored personnel carriers (APCs) entered the property.

One

blocked the northwest window of the Singer house from which shots
were fired (Tr. 12-7, pp. 68-69).

The other was used to evacuate

the injured Fred House (Tr. 12-6, p. 24), after which the APC
returned and was used to evacuate Defendant to a nearby ambulance
(Tr. 12-7, 172-173).

Shortly afterwards, F.B.I, agents received

a telephone call from Jonathan Swapp, who had hooked up the phone
again.

Jonathan indicated that the family was willing to

surrender (Tr. 12-5, pp. 124-126).

Thereafter, Jonathan Swapp,

John Timothy Singer and the other members of the Singer family
left the house and surrendered themselves to federal custody.
Lt. Fred House was pronounced dead on arrival at the
University of Utah Medical Center on January 28, 1988 (Tr. 12-8,
p. 145). The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin Sweeney,
testified that Lt. House died as a result of a single gunshot
wound to his chest (Tr. 12-8, p. 153). The projectile entered
Lt. House's chest directly below the right nipple and travelled
backward and downward from right to left (Tr. 12-8, p. 151). The
projectile nicked the aorta, which caused the death (Tr. 12-8, p.
152).
Ten expended .30 caliber bullets were recovered after
the shooting (Exhibits B-l through B-9, and B-37).

Seven were

fired from John Timothy Singer's Plainfield carbine (Tr. 12-13,
p. 273), which was located on a table in John Timothy Singer's
bedroom at the north end annex of the Singer house (Tr. 12-13,
pp. 157-159).

That Plainfield .30 caliber carbine had been

purchased from a gun shop in West Valley City by John Timothy
Singer in January of 1988 (Tr. 12-9, pp. 98-103).
Of the seven rounds fired from John Timothy Singer's
rifle, one was recovered from the floor of the Bates house in the
same location where HRT members had removed Lt. House's clothing
and administered first aid (Tr. 12-7, p. 289). A substance found
on that projectile tested positive for type 0 human blood,
consistent with the blood found on the shirt of the victim (Tr.
12-8, pp. 58-61).

Another round was found in the jacket of FBI

Agent Don Roberts, who was in the Jepsen home when the shooting
started and was hit by a round, but not injured because he was
wearing a bullet-proof vest (Tr. 12-8, p. 17-32).

Four other

rounds were recovered from inside the Bates house (Tr. 12-7, pp.
282-290; Tr. 12-8, pp. 73-74).

A seventh round was taken from a

vehicle parked in the driveway of the Jepsen house during the
shooting (Tr. 12-8, pp. 12-13).
After being taken into custody, John Timothy Singer was
given a Miranda warning, waived his rights, and gave a statement
to officers wherein he admitted that he was seated in his
wheelchair in his bedroom looking out his window in the Singer
home when Addam and Jonathan went out to milk the goat on January
28, 1988. He said that when he saw dogs running from the Bates
house he grabbed his rifle and fired at the dogs.

He denied

firing at any people (Tr. 12-9, pp. 55-81; Exhibit E-7).

Two .30 caliber rounds fired from Jonathan Swapp's
Alpine carbine were recovered from the Jepsen garage (Tr. 12-7,
p. 296;

Tr. 12-8, p. 7; Tr. 12-13, p. 265). A third round was

recovered from a first floor ceiling joist in the Bates house
(Tr. 12-8, pp. 186-189).

Two expended .30 caliber casings which

had been ejected from the Alpine carbine were found on the ground
in the snow at the northeast corner of the Singer house in the
area where Agent Metcalf had seen Jonathan Swapp kneel and point
his rifle (Tr. 12-8, pp. 183). Firearms identification and
trajectory analysis evidence revealed that the rounds fired from
the Alpine rifle at the northeast corner of the Singer house went
through the doorway of the Bates house, passed through the narrow
corridor where the agents were scrambling for cover, exited
through a rear window, and ultimately lodged where they were
found in the garage of the Jepsen house (Tr. 12-13, pp. 256-257).
After the occupants surrendered, search warrants were
executed on the Singer property and structures, including the
Singer house.

The agents searching that house discovered a

virtual arsenal in that dwelling (Exhibit D-6.2).

Firearms and

ammunition were found in positions close to windows and makeshift
gun ports. A total of twenty-three handguns, shotguns and
rifles, including the Plainfield .30 caliber carbine and the
Alpine .30 cal. carbine from which the rounds were earlier fired
were recovered from the residence and property (Tr. 12-13, pp.
132-187).

Eight thousand three hundred and four (8,304) rounds

of ammunition were found stacked in places within the residence
where they could be easily reached for reloading (Tr, 12-13, p.

186; Tr. 12-14, p. 261).

Of the twenty-three firearms

recovered, twenty-one were fully functional, seventeen were
loaded when seized, and sixteen had no safety or had the safeties
off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 132-187).
where he had fallen.

Defendant Swapp's .30-06 was found

It was loaded, with one round chambered and

seven rounds in the clip.

The safety was off (Tr. 12-13, pp.

172-173) .
After Lt. House was killed and Defendant was recovering
from his injuries, he called and spoke with a news reporter, Rodd
Wagner of the Salt Lake Tribune.

In response to Wagner's

question why Fred House had to die, Addam Swapp responded, "Well,
hey, listen.
the

Listen to me.

governor.

what happened."

You read the letter that I sent to

You read it carefully, the last p.s., and that's
Wagner said "You're saying that the warning was

given?" and Defendant responded, "Yes."

(Tr. 12-14, p. 38)

During the trial, Defendant testified, admitted to the
bombing of the Stake Center and conceded that he anticipated a
confrontation with local law enforcement as a result (Tr. 12-14,
pp. 152, 204, 234). He admitted that he had sawed off a couple
of shotguns in anticipation of a confrontation with law
enforcement, and that he considered twenty firearms on the
property to be his guns (Tr. 12-14, pp. 222-223).

He also

admitted that during the 13 days he had fired approximately 100
shots in the directions of the lights and speakers (Tr. 12-14,
pp. 172-175/ 225), and that he knew officers were erecting the
lights when he fired in their direction (Tr. 12-14, pp. 218-219).
He admitted that he had written the letter to the Governor,

including the warning not to enter the boundary line of the
property, and that he considered the Bates house to be part of
the Singer property (Tr. 12-14, pp. 236-237).

Although he denied

shouldering his weapon during the shootout (Tr. 12-14, p. 189),
he admitted that when he went out to milk the goat on January 28,
1988, he was armed with a fully loaded rifle, 2 loaded six guns,
and extra ammunition (Tr. 12-14, p. 258, 269).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.
in this case.

Defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars
The State provided him with a 12-page affidavit of

probable cause filed in connection with the Information.
Further, the State provided him with three (3) memoranda of legal
theories which also contained factual allegations and tied them
to the State's theory of accomplice or "party" liability.

The

State presented essentially the same evidence as had been
presented in Defendant's federal trial, and there was no claim on
his part that he was surprised by any of the evidence presented
in the State's case.

Further, he has failed to allege how his

failure to obtain a bill of particulars affected his ability to
prepare an adequate defense or how it in any way deprived him of
the opportunity to assert a defense he reasonably might have had
against the charge.

In any event, any error here asserted would

be harmless error under Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
2.

The trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code

Ann. §76-3-401, which limits aggregate minimum sentences which

may be imposed to 12 years, to be inapplicable where the prior
sentence involved a federal determinate sentence•

The trial

court's interpretation was consistent with precedent from other
jurisdictions, as well as with the Utah State Legislature's
subsequent amendment of the statute which made clear that the
section limits only the effect of consecutive sentences and not
the court's authority to impose such.

The trial court limited

the Defendant's aggregate maximum sentence under the statute to
30 years, giving effect to the reasonable limitation of sentences
provided by the statute without giving the Defendant a windfall
to which he was not entitled.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR BILL
OF PARTICULARS WHERE HE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ON NOTICE OF
THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM,
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides in pertinent part as follows:
When facts not set out in an information
or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the
offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a
written motion for a bill of particulars. . .
The request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement
of factual information needed to set forth
the essential elements of the particular
offense charged.
If an information does not adequately notify an accused
of what he is charged with, he has a right to a bill of
particulars, and he is entitled to whatever information the

prosecutor has that may be useful in helping to fix the date,
time, and place, of the alleged offense. A bill of particulars,
however, is not a device to enable the defendant to obtain a
preview of the prosecution's evidence.

State v. Robbins/ 709

P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985).
Similarly, there is no requirement in a bill of
particulars that the defendant be told what evidence will be
presented to prove the charge against him, and if the charging
document is sufficiently clear as to what the crime is, the
defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars at all.

State

v. Moraine, 475 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1970).
The central notion is that a defendant is entitled to
sufficient information to enable him to adequately prepare a
defense.

In State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988), the Utah

Supreme Court reversed a conviction for Racketeering by means of
drug trafficking where the defendant was charged by indictment
under the vague general language of the racketeering (or RICE)
statute and was not afforded a sufficient bill of particulars
upon demand.

The Court there stated:

Although an information may be accompanied by
a fact statement detailing the prosecution's
contentions in support of the charges, an
information or indictment is legally
sufficient even if it consists of nothing
more than an extremely summary statement of
the charge that would not provide the accused
with sufficient particulars to prepare an
adequate defense.
When an indictment or
information legally sufficient under rule
4(b) does not provide the notice guaranteed
by article I, section 12, the accused may
request a bill of particulars under rule
4(e)....
Id. at 104 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).

The Court in Bell went on to point out that the
indictment in that case "merely repeated verbatim the broad,
vague language of the RICE statute without describing any facts
or circumstances constituting the crime charged other than a
statement that the crime had been committed during a ten-month
period."

Id. at 104. The peculiar complexities of the RICE

statute required that the State provide clarification (i.e. what
constituted the alleged "enterprise"?) in order to adequately
inform the defendant of the charges so that he could prepare his
defense.

Id., at 103.
By contrast, the Information in the case before the

Court was accompanied by an extensive 12-page affidavit setting
out factual allegations in support of the charges. (R. 2-6)

(See

Addendum A, "Information" and " Affidavit of Probable Cause for
Information.")
Although not required by the statute, the State in its
response to Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars also
provided Defendant with a memorandum of authority concerning its
legal theories, which also contained factual allegations (R. 249252, 438-446).

(See Addendum B, "State's Response to Defendant

Addam Swapp's Motion for Bill of Particulars" and Addendum C,
"Memorandum of Authority Re: Principles of Accomplice Liability
and of Legal Causation.")
Those legal theories are consistent with the position
taken by the State throughout the proceedings that the Defendant
was criminally responsible as the leader of the group engaged in

a 13-day armed resistance to lawful authority which culminated in
the death of Lt. Fred House as he and his co-defendants jointly
resisted officers by the use of deadly weapons.

Although

characterized in Defendant's brief as conceptually complex, it is
not.
Defendant was well aware from the Affidavit of Probable
Cause and from other memoranda filed by the State (alluded to
below) that the State never asserted that he personally fired the
fatal shot, and that the State's theory was always that he was
responsible as an accomplice or party to the offense under §76-2202.
Defendant points out that he was charged under three
subsections of second degree murder, and asserts that this
somehow confused him and made him unable to adequately prepare
his defense without a bill of particulars.

He does not allege

how his preparation would have differed depending on which theory
he was defending.

Moreover, it is clear that the State was not

required to elect a theory, State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1138
(Utah 1977), and that the three statutory theories alleged
comprise but one offense of second degree murder.

State v.

Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 167 (Utah 1987).
In Russell, the defendant was charged with second
degree murder under the same three theories alleged in the
instant case, and the Utah Supreme Court rejected his claim that
he was entitled to a jury instruction requiring a unanimous
verdict on any one of the theories.

The Court held that although

second degree murder may be committed in different manners and
with different mens rea, it is but one offense.

Ld. at 167.

Defendant's assertion that the closest he came to
learning the prosecution's theory of the case came during closing
arguments is disingenuous.

The closing argument was a

recapitulation of the opening statement and of the memoranda and
arguments submitted at the time of the hearing on Defendant's
Motion for Bill of Particulars.

The prosecution maintained a

consistent posture throughout the proceedings.
During opening statement, the prosecutor discussed
accomplice liability (Tr. 12-2, p. 35), and stated the following:
Ladies and gentlemen, the State believes
that the evidence will show that although the
fatal shot was fired by Timothy Singer, he
didn't act alone. These defendants stood
together in armed resistance of lawful
authority for 13 days by the use of firearms.
They had those full 13 days to reconsider
what they were doing and to prevent
bloodshed. The evidence will show that Addam
Swapp was the leader of the armed resistance
and it was he who set in motion the events
which ended with the death of Officer House.
He not only intended this violent
confrontation but he insisted upon it, and he
more than anyone else could have prevented
what happened that day. He set in motion
events, the probable and natural consequences
of which was the death of the officer.
(Tr. 12-2, pp. 33-34)
That same theory was clearly set out in several of the
State's memoranda filed prior to the hearing on Defendant's
Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which were alluded to by
the prosecutor at the hearing.

(Tr. 11-16, pp. 79)

Specifically, those memos include the following:
1) "Memorandum of Authority Re: Principles of
Accomplice Liability and of Legal Causation" (R. 438-446);
2) "State's Memorandum Re: Admissibility of Evidence of
Other Crimes and Conduct of Addcim Swapp Under Rule 404(b), U.R.E.
(Sheriff Eley incident)" (R. 450-462); and
3) "State's Memorandum Re: Admissibility of Evidence of
Other Crimes and Conduct Under Rule 404(b), U.R.E." (R. 463-471).
For example, in evaluating Defendant's claim that the
closest he ever came to learning the prosecution's theory came at
closing, consider the following language from the "State's
Memorandum Re: Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes and
Conduct of Addam Swapp Under Rule 404(b), U.R.E. (Sheriff Eley
incident)":
The State contends that Addam Swapp set
in motion events the natural and probable
outcome of which was death. He set the stage
for a foreseeably tragic outcome. His own
conduct, separate and distinct from that of
John Timothy Singer (whom he encouraged in
armed resistance), exhibited a conscious
disregard for life. He acted with depraved
indifference to human life and engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk of death
to another. That conduct culminated on
January 28, 1988, with the death of Lt. Fred
House, but it did not begin there. His
threats to the Summit County officers in
October indicated his intent to forcibly
resist any law enforcement officers who might
attempt to come onto the property to question
or arrest him. When placed in context with
his subsequent bombing of the church and his
announcement to the world that he was
responsible for it, (i.e. placing pole with
inscription at scene and speaking with news
reporter day of bombing), together with his

steadfast armed resistance and his complete
refusal to negotiate a peaceful settlement to
the stand-off, it is clear that Addam Swapp
not only intended a bloody confrontation, but
absolutely insisted upon it.
(R. 459.)
This is not a case where the defense was surprised by
evidence presented at trial. As the Defendant himself has
pointed out, just prior to this case he was previously convicted
of several federal crimes, some of which arose from the same
criminal episode out of which the State homicide charge arose.
He was therefore particularly familiar with the factual basis of
the charges against him, and in a uniquely knowledgeable position
to prepare an adequate defense to the charge.

At no time during

the homicide prosecution did he assert that evidence presented by
the State caught him by surprise or unprepared.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that under the
circumstances the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars, and that the
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling.

State v. Riddle,

112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948).
Further, Defendant has failed to allege how the trial
court's denial of his Motion for Bill of Particulars could have
prejudiced his case.

To establish prejudicial error justifying

reversal on appeal, Defendant must show that the denial of his
motion "deprived him of the opportunity to assert a defense he
reasonably might have had against the charges."
Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985).

State v.

Defendant has not

alluded to any defense which he might have raised had more detail
been provided through a bill of particulars, assuming it were
even possible for the State to provide more detail than had
already been provided when the bill was sought.
Finally, under Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, any erroneous denial of a motion for bill of
particulars would only require reversal where, absent the error,
there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to
the accused, thereby undermining the Court's confidence in the
outcome of the trial.

The Defendant has not made a plausible

argument that his defense was impaired, nor has he alleged how a
bill of particulars would have assisted him in asserting any
available defense or would have likely affected the outcome of
the trial in any way.
In the event the Court finds that Defendant has made a
plausible argument that his defense was impaired by a failure to
provide a bill of particulars, the record in this case
demonstrates that any such error did not affect his substantial
rights in this case and should be deemed harmless under Rule 30
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE WAS PROPER UNDER UTAH LAW
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to a term consecutive to that imposed upon him in
his federal trial. As authority he cites Utah Code Ann. §76-3-

401 (1978)(amended 1989), which at the time he was sentenced read
in pertinent part as follows:
(4) If a court lawfully determined to
impose consecutive sentences, the aggregate
minimum of all sentences imposed may not
exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the
aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed
may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment. .
(5) The limitation in subsection (4)
applies:
•

• •

(c) If a defendant has already been
sentenced by a court of this state
other than the present sentencing court
or by a court of another state or
federal jurisdiction.
At sentencing the question arose as to whether the
minimum aggregate limitation in the statute would operate to bar
the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case, since Addam
Swapp had already been sentenced to a determinate term of more
than 12 years in connection with his federal convictions.
The parties researched and briefed the issue, after
which the trial court ruled that the prohibition of aggregate
minimum sentences exceeding 12 years was inapplicable where the
sentence of the first sentencing court is a determinate sentence,
citing People v. Dye, 69 111.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630, 633-34
(1977). (R. 1367-1370)

(See Addendum D, Judge Murphy's "Summary

Decision.")
In Dye, the defendant had been convicted of a federal
offense and sentenced to a determinate term of 5 years. He was
thereafter convicted in state court of forgery, which carried an

indeterminate term of from 1 to 10 years.

The trial court

ordered the defendant's state sentence to run consecutively to
his previously imposed federal 5-year term, and he appealed.
The Illinois statute pertaining to consecutive
sentencing [which referred to both state and federal sentences in
§1005-8-4(a)] limited the aggregate minimum period of consecutive
sentences to "twice the lowest minimum term authorized under
Section 5-8-1 for the most serious felony involved."
111.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, §1005-8-4(c).
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, held
that the Federal determinate sentence previously imposed had to
be considered to be both the minimum and the maximum terms under
the Illinois statute.

The Court further found that the more

serious felony was the state forgery offense (1-10 years as
opposed to 5 years for the federal offense), that the aggregate
minimum could therefore be no greater than 2 years, and that
since the federal determinate term was for 5 years, consecutive
sentences could not be imposed.

People v. Dye, 45 Ill.App.3d

465, 359 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ill.App.4 Dist. 1977).
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed in People v.
Dye, 371 N.E.2d 630 (1977), stating:
Because by their very nature, Federal
determinate sentences have no maximum or
minimum, the appellate court considered the
5-year sentence actually imposed against the
defendant as the minimum period for that
sentence .
In our opinion, the appellate court
erred in determining that the sentencing
provision in issue applied to Federal

determinative sentences. The section clearly
confines its application to situations where
the aggregate minimum terms of imprisonment
can be calculated. Federal determinate
sentences do not have minimum or maximum
terms.
371 N.E.2d at 633-634.
The Court also pointed out policy reasons against
interpreting federal sentences as "minimum sentences" in limiting
consecutive sentences:
Also, if this provision were held to
apply to Federal determinative sentences, and
the Illinois offense were the most serious,
judges would be precluded from imposing
consecutive sentences . . . in situations
where the determinative sentence was greater
than 2 years and the Illinois offense is less
than a Class 1 felony. . . .
Id. at 634.
Similarly under Utah law, if §76-3-401(4) were to be
interpreted to include federal determinate sentences as "minimum"
sentences, any offender who had been previously sentenced to a
determinate term of over 11 years in the federal system would be
immune from imposition of a consecutive Utah sentence for a
second degree felony term (1-15 years) notwithstanding the fact
that such an offender might have been sentenced in federal court
to less than half of the 30-year maximum limitation proscribed,
and notwithstanding the fact that in-state offenders could be
sentenced to two consecutive second degree felony terms.

Such an

interpretation would constitute an unnecessary windfall to the
federally-convicted defendant and would not serve the end of
preventing "arbitrary or oppressive treatment of

persons. ..convicted of offenses," according to the purposes and
principles of statutory construction delineated in Utah Code Ann.
§76-1-104 (1990).
The purpose for statutory limitation on consecutive
sentences, as indicated in the Commentary to the Model Penal
Code, is to guard against oppressive sentences. ("The occasional
abuse that results in sentences built up to the level of 100
years or more illustrates the problem." M.P.C. and Commentaries,
1985 ed. § 7.06, p. 272.)

No oppression to a defendant results

by considering federal determinate sentences only in determining
the aggregate maximum allowable under §76-3-401(4), particularly
where such sentences by definition have no minimum term which can
be computed under the statute.
At the time that §76-3-401 was enacted in 1973, the
only significant minimum term imposed under Utah's general
classification of felonies was that imposed for a first degree
felony (5 year minimum term, life top).

In determining what

level of consecutive sentencing the legislature may have intended
to limit under §76-3-401(4), note that consecutive sentencing for
two first degree felonies (5 to life) and two second degree
felonies (1 to 15) would still be within the acceptable minimum
term of 12 years.
In Utah, the legislature determines the degree of
felony for a given offense which, upon conviction, carries a
minimum and maximum term.
several years.

Such terms are generally separated by

(14 year period between minimum and maximum term

for a second degree felony, for example.)

Once a defendant is

convicted of a felony offense and committed to the Utah State
Prison, the Board of Pardons has broad discretion within the
minimum and maximum terms to determine the actual time an inmate
serves at the prison, Utah Code Ann. §77-27-5 (Supp. 1990).

[In

fact, the power and authority of the Board of Pardons is so broad
that it may, under its statutory and constitutional authority to
commute sentences, go below the minimum term imposed under the
state's indeterminate sentencing scheme.

§77-27-5(1)(a) (1990);

Utah Const, art. VII, § 12.]
In the federal system, by contrast, it is the judge and
not the parole authority who determines the amount of time a
convicted defendant serves in prison.

The judge does not

therefore impose any indeterminate minimum and maximum sentence.
Looking for a "minimum" sentencing term within such a system and
attempting to correlate it to Utah's indeterminate sentencing
scheme cannot meaningfully be done.

People v. Dye, 371 N.E.2d

630, 633-634 (111. 1977).
The rationale in Dye that federal determinate sentences
are inapplicable in computing aggregate minimum terms has been
applied as well to determinate sentences imposed by another
state, People v. Presley, 385 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.App.4 Dist. 1979),
as well as to determinate sentences imposed within the sentencing
state itself. People v. Peebles, 465 N.E.2d 539 (Ill.App.l Dist.
1984).

The same principle applies - where a sentence is

determinate, no minimum term can be calculated.

In the instant case, the trial court determined that
the language of §76-3-401 concerning limitations on aggregate
minimums and aggregate maximums does not limit the court's
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences but merely dictates
the effect of such sentences.

(R. 1367-1370) (See Addendum D,

Judge Murphy's "Summary Decision.")

The court did provide,

pursuant to §76-3-401(4) that although Defendant's sentence was
to be served consecutively to his federal term, the aggregate
maximum term of both sentences could in no event exceed 30 years.
(R. 1422-1425) (See Addendum E, "Judgment Sentence, and
Commitment")
Further supporting the trial court's interpretation is
the fact that during the 1989 General Session, the Utah State
Legislature amended §76-3-401 to clarify its legislative intent.
Among other changes, the Legislature added a new subsection 76-3401(8) which provides as follows:
(8) This section may not be construed
to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be
imposed or to affect the validity of any
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the
length of sentences actually served under the
commitments.
"When a statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive
evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the former,
unamended statute."
1988).

State v Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah

(Parenthetically, the Legislature also deleted from

subsection 76-3-401(4) the minimum aggregate limitation of 12
years, but retained the maximum aggregate limitation of 30
years.)

The trial court in this case did not err in not
calculating the federal determinate term of the defendant as a
"minimum" term within the meaning of §76-3-401.

The trial

court's interpretation of the statute was sound, as it gave
effect to the reasonable limitation of sentences provided by the
statute without giving the Defendant a windfall to which he was
not entitled.

The sentence in this case should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied Defendant's Motion For
Bill of Particulars where he was sufficiently notified of the
charge against him and was able to prepare an adequate defense.
The trial court also imposed a lawful consecutive sentence in
this case.

Both the conviction and sentence should be affirmed

by the Court.

DATED this oZi^day of ^j^^^dlx

, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Assistant Attorney General
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
CREIGHTON C. MORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN - 2889
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, COALVILLE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADDAM W. SWAPP,
DOB: 4/6/61

*

Bail $ / /• , «'j>A / /-

i

Judge Maurice D. Jones

t

INFORMATION

JONATHAN RAMON SWAPP,
DOB: 5/6/67
Case Number
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER,
DOB: 9/3/66
Defendants.
The undersigned, Ronald E. Miller, Criminal
Investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office, upon oath,
states on information and belief that the defendants, ADDAM W.
SWAPP, JONATHAN SWAPP, and JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, committed the
following crimes;

CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a First
Degree Felony, in Summit County, Utah, on or about January 28,

1988, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203 (a),(b),
•nd/or (c), and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendants, ADDAM W.
SWAPP, JOANATHAN R. SWAPP, and JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, as parties to
the offense, intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Fred
House; and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another, said defendants committed an act clearly dangerous to
human life that caused the death of Fred House; and/or acting
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, said defendants knowingly engaged in conduct which created
a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of
Fred House.
DATED this

i_

day of

tona

V 1988

E. Miller, Affiant

Subscribed and sworn Xo before^ro^
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HONORABLE MAURICE TFT'JONES
Third Circuit Court Judge

This Information is based upon evidence from the
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1.

Robert Bryant

2.

David Johnson

/,

3.

Jerry Pope

4.

Robert Berry

5.

Joe Offret

6.

John Butler

7.

Martin Brown

8.

Dave Edward

9.

Steve Wiley

10. Rick Intellini
11. Hugh McKinney
12. Catherine Baker
13. Robert Brinkman
14. Kent Wilde
15. Ron Baxter
16. Richard Crum
17. Hal Metcalfe
18. Dr. E.S. Sweeney
19. Robert Baldwin
20. Donald Roberts
21. Donald Jepsen
22. Miriam Jepsen
23. Phillip Mitchell
24. Larry Meadows
25. Charles D. Shepherd
26. Felix Garcia
27. Ryan Nell
28. Dave Nell
29. Cal Clegg

30. Chad Gibbs
31. Tommy Whitman
32. Scott Barker
33. Hike Kelly
34. Jim Evans
of
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division

By:

CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General

REQUEST THAT DEFENDANTS BE HELD WITHOUT BAIL:
Defendants have all been convicted of federal felony offenses in
Federal District Court and have all been sentenced by Judge Bruce
Jenkins to minimum mandatory prison terms on September 2, 1988.
The State will acquire temporary jurisdiction over the defendants
through writs of habeus corpus ad prosecuendum to try them on the
instant charges# after which all defendants will be returned to
the custody of federal officials to begin serving their prison
sentences. Hence# the State requests that the defendants listed
above be held during the pendency of the instant case without
bail.
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Chief, Litigation Division
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, COALVILLE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR INFORMATION

-vsADDAM W. SWAPP,
DOB: 4/6/61
JONATHAN RAMON SWAPP,
DOB: 5/6/67

Case No.

JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER,
DOB: 9/3/66
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)
I SB
)

I, Ronald E. Miller, being first duly sworn upon oath,
depose and state as followsi

1.

I am a criminal investigator for the Utah Attorney

General's Office.

2.

In connection with this investigation, I have

interviewed witnesses, reviewed witness statements, collected and
examined physical evidence obtained by search warrant, and
reviewed official Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime
Laboratory and Utah State Crime Laboratory reports.

I believe

these sources of information to be trustworthy, and the
information gathered to be true and correct.

3.

On January 16, 1988 Defendant Addam Swapp and

others planted and detonated an explosive device in an LDS Church
chapel in Marion, Utah.

Federal authorities subsequently

indicted Defendant Addam Swapp for the bombing, and Defendant
Addam Swapp's mother-in-law, Vickie Singer, for aiding and
abetting.

After the bombing, Defendant Addam Swapp, his brother

Defendant Jonathan Swapp, and Vickie Singer barricaded themselves
on the Singer family property, and refused to surrender to law
enforcement authorities.

Also barricaded on the property were

Defendant John Timothy Singer, Defendant Addam Swapp's two wives,
Heidi Singer Swapp and Charlotte Singer Swapp, their six juvenile
children, and Vickie Singer's three juvenile sons, totaling
fifteen people.

The Singer/Swapp families remained barricaded on

the property for thirteen days before surrendering.

*

4.

The Singer family property is approximately 2.33

acres with four residences and a number of outbuildings.

The

defendants and family members were barricaded in the main
residence.

Approximately 215 feet west of the main residence was

a house known as the Bates house; approximately 187 feet west of
the Bates house was a second residence known as the Jepsen house.
The Bates house was vacant during the thirteen day siege, and the
Jepsen house was used as an observation post by law enforcement
authorities.

5.

The United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Utah
State, and Summit County law enforcement authorities cooperated
in resolving the siege.

Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Robert

Bryant and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) David Johnson were in
charge of FBI personnel.

SAC Bryant requested the help of

Lieutenant Fred House and his dog "Mike" from the Utah State
Department of Corrections to assist in a plan to arrest
Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp.

Lt. Fred House was a

certified Utah State Peace Officer.

6.

Between January 16, 1988 when the siege started

until January 28, 1986 when it ended, FBI and other law

enforcement personnel maintained twenty-four hour surveillance on
the Singer property and occupants.

On frequent occasions,

surveillance personnel observed Defendant Addam Swapp armed with
pistols, a knife, and a rifle, and Defendant Jonathan Swapp armed
with a pistol and a rifle.
property while armed.

Both defendants moved about the

Repeated requests for surrender were

ignored.

7.

On January 20, 1988, Special Agent in Charge Nolan

Douglas of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms wrote a
letter advising Defendant Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer that
warrants for their arrest and search warrants for the property
had been issued in connection with the bombing of the LDS church
building in Marion.

Douglas advised that they should surrender

immediately and end the standoff.

8.

On January 26, 1988, a letter from Governor Norman

Bangerter was delivered to Defendant Addam Swapp and Vickie
Singer, wherein the Governor entreated them to surrender.

The

following day both wrote reply letters to the Governor•
Defendant Addam Swapp indicated in his letter that he would not
surrender and declared the Singer property an independent
sovereign nation.

He further warned the Governor that any man

who attempted to cross the Singer property boundary would be
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treated as an aggressor# and that they would defend themselves in
any manner they saw fit.

9.

Based on surveillance observations, SAC Bryant and

SSA Johnson devised a tactical plan to capture Defendants Addam
Swapp and Jonathan Swapp with the assistance of Lt. Fred House
and his dog.

The plan was for a team consisting of FBI agents

and Lt. Fred House with his dog to infiltrate the Bates house on
the Singer property.

Loudspeakers would be set up on the north

perimeter of the property near the Bates house, and when
Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp attempted to disable the
speakers, a canine handler would send his dog to incapacitate
them until FBI agents could control them.

Lt. House and the FBI

team in the Bates house would cut off the defendants' retreat, or
arrest them if they entered the Bates house.

10.

In the late night hours of January 27, 1988

Officer Fred House with his dog "Mike", and an FBI team entered
the Bates house through a west living room window out of view
from the main Singer residence.

The FBI team consisted of

Special Agents John Butler, Martin Brown, Rick Intellini, Dave
Edward, Steve Wiley, and Hugh McKinney.

In the early morning

hours of January 28, 1988 the plan was put into effect, but
failed when the dog sent to incapacitate Defendants Addam and

Jonathan Swapp became confused and returned to its master.

Both

Swapps returned to the main residence without going into the
Bates house.

11.

After the failure of the initial plan, SAC Bryant

and SSA Johnson decided on a fall-back plan based on prior
observations of Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp.

The

surveillance had noted that every morning the two men milked a
goat in a shed approximately midway between the main Singer
residence and the Bates house.

The FBI team would stay in the

Bates house, and when Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp came
out to milk the goat# two dogs would be sent to incapacitate
them.

Officer Jerry Pope, also a Department of Corrections

Canine Handler, and his dog "Pacson" were sent to the Bates house
to assist Lt. Fred House.

12.

At approximately 8:19AM, January 28, 1988

Defendant Addam Swapp and Defendant Jonathan Swapp walked to the
goat shed from the main residence.

Both carried rifles with

shoulder straps slung over their shoulders.

SAC Bryant and SSA

Johnson gave permission to the team in the Bates house to carry
out the arrest plan.

13.

Lt. Fred House moved to the entry way near the

front door of the Bates house with his dog, and Officer Jerry
Pope was behind and to one side with his dog.

SA Butler stood

behind Officer Pope, and SA Brown stood behind Lt. Fred House.
Special Agents Wiley, Intellini, Edward, and McKinney were on the
second floor.

SA Intellini sighted his assault rifle through a

stairway landing window.

At approximately 8:28AM Lt. House

opened the front door, and he and Officer Pope keyed their dogs
on Defendants Addam Swapp and Jonathan Swapp who were walking
from the goat shed to the main residence.

14.

As the dogs left the doorway, gunfire erupted and

bullets started hitting the front door and entry way of the Bates
house.

Special Agents Butler and Intellini observed Defendant

Addam Swapp turn, unsling his rifle, and aim it in their
direction.

Butler and Intellini fired their weapons almost

simultaneously, one shot each, and Defendant Addam Swapp was hit
and knocked to the ground.

SA Brown heard Lt. House groan, and

saw him fall back in the hallway closet.

The dogs reentered the

Bates house, and SA Butler then managed to close the front door
with a broom handle.
closed the door.

The incoming gunfire stopped when SA Butler

SA's Butler and Brown dragged Lt. House to the

kitchen, lifted his body armor, and discovered a wound in his
aide.

Lt. House was unconscious.

15.

When the gunfire erupted, SA Hal Metcalfe was

watching Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp through binoculars
from his position in the Jepsen house. After moving his
binoculars momentarily towards the Singer house, he looked back
and observed Defendant Jonathan Swapp aiming his rifle in
Metcalfe's direction from a kneeling position near the northeast
corner of the main residence.

SA Metcalfe yelled for everyone in

the Jepsen house to get down, and immediately after doing so
bullets struck the house.

16.

The FBI evacuated Lt. House to the University

Medical Center, Salt Lake City, Utah, where doctors pronounced
him dead on arrival.

An autopsy was performed later that same

day by Utah State Medical Examiner Dr. Edwin Sweeney.

He ruled

that death was the result of a perforating gunshot wound to the
chest, and that the manner of death was homicide.

17.

Defendant John Timothy Singer, who is confined to

a wheelchair, gave a statement to SA's Felix Garcia, ATF, and
Ronald E. Miller, Utah State Attorney General's Office, wherein
he admitted that he sat at the west window of his bedroom in the
main residence watching Defendants Addam and Jonathan Swapp when
they went to milk the goat; that when Addam and Jonathan

thereafter walked back toward the main residence, he saw two dogs
come out the open front doorway of the Bates house; that he
shouted "dogs", grabbed a .30 caliber semiautomatic carbine from
his table, and began shooting.

Although Defendant J. Timothy

Singer indicated he knew law enforcement personnel were probably
in the Bates house, he denied that he intentionally shot at
anyone, and stated that he only shot at the dogs.

Defendant

Singer also stated that Defendant Addam Swapp had a .30-06
caliber military Garand, and that Defendant Jonathan Swapp had a
.30 caliber semiautomatic carbine when they went to milk the
goat.

18.

Shortly after the gunfire ended, SA Charles

Shepherd observed Defendant J. Timothy Singer at the west window
area of his bedroom, and also observed Defendant Jonathan Swapp
in the same room carrying a rifle.

19.

ATF agents recovered a .30 caliber Plainfield

carbine without a shoulder sling from the table in Defendant
Singer's room, and a .30 caliber Alpine military carbine with a
shoulder sling from the bed in Defendant Singer's room.

FBI

surveillance photographs disclosed that the firearm carried by
Defendant Jonathan Swapp had a shoulder sling, and that his
firearm was carried in the slung position before the shooting
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started.

A .30-06 Garand was recovered in the snow near where

Defendant Addam Swapp was shot.

20.

David Nell and Ryan Nell of Golden Spike Firearms,

West Valley City, Utah, sold the Plainfield .30 caliber carbine
to Defendant J. Timothy Singer on January 7, 1988.

21.

Investigators and Utah State Crime Laboratory

technicians recovered ten fired .30 caliber carbine bullets:
Five from inside the Bates house, one from the outside wall of
the Bates house near the front door, two from the Jepsen house
garage, one from the clothing of an FBI agent who was struck
after the bullet went through the kitchen wall of the Jepsen
house, and one from a car parked in the Jepsen driveway.

A video

tape recording of the actual shooting taken by Summit County
Reserve Sheriff's Deputy James Evans disclosed the sound of
eleven gunshots on the audio portion of the recording.

22.

SA Richard Crum, FBI Crime Laboratory, assisted by

surveyors Ron Baxter and Kent Wilde, discovered that the Bates
house front doorway and the Jepsen house kitchen were within
Defendant J. Timothy Singer's field of fire from his bedroom
window.

However, SA Crum found that the two bullet holes in the

Jepsen house garage tracked back through the west window of the
Bates house, through the length of the Bates house, out the front
doorway, and to a point near the northeast outside corner of the
main Singer residence where SA Hal Metcalfe saw Defendant

Jonathan Swapp aim his rifle.

SA Crum tracked the bullet hole in

the outside wall of the Bates house to the same location.

23.

Based on his firearms analysis, SA Crum further

discovered that the five .30 caliber carbine bullets recovered
from inside the Bates house were fired by Defendant J. Timothy
Singer's Plainfield carbine.

The Utah State Crime Laboratory

determined that one of the five bullets had blood stains that
were consistent with the blood type of Lt. Fred House.

The

bullets recovered from the Jepsen car and from the clothing of
the FBI agent who had been struck in the Jepsen house kitchen
were also fired by Defendant J. Timothy Singer's Plainfield
carbine.

24.

SA Crum's analysis revealed that the bullet

recovered from the outside wall of the Bates house, and the two
bullets recovered from the Jepsen house garage were fired by the
Alpine carbine.

25.

Investigators recovered 22 empty .30 caliber

carbine shells from inside Defendant J. Timothy Singer's bedroom,
including eight from the floor near the window where he said he
had been firing.

Two more were found in the snow near the

northeast corner of the main residence.

SA Crum determined that

all the empty .30 caliber carbine shells from Defendant Singer's
bedroom were fired by his Plainfield carbine, and that the two
shells found near the northeast corner of the residence were
fired by the Alpine carbine.

26.

Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to

believe that Defendants Addam W Swapp, Jonathan R. Swapp, and
John Timothy Singer, as parties to the offense, intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of Lt. Fred House; and/or, intending
to cause serious bodily injury to another, said defendants
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which caused the
death of Lt. Fred House; and/or, acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the defendants
knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death
to another and thereby caused the death of Lt. Fred House.

27.

Defendants John Timothy Singer, Addam Swapp, and

Jonathan Swapp were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, and were
each convicted of attempted second degree homicide of a Federal
officer in Federal District Court orr May $^1988. /J
DATED this

1988.

RONALD E. MILLER
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORff^to *>efQj

this

V

day of \.'

/*e

1988.

t^gport Judge

ADDENDUM B

DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
CREIGHTON C. HORTON - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN - 2889
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
:

STATE OF UTAH
:

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT
ADDAM SWAPP'S MOTION FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS

:

Criminal No. 1218

t

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Plaintiff,
-vsADDAM W. SWAPP,
Defendant.

The State of Utah, by and through Creighton C. Horton
II, Assistant Attorney General, and David J. Schwendiman, Special
Assistant Attorney General, hereby responds to Defendant Addam
Swapp's Motion For Bill of Particulars as followst

1.

At the time the State filed its criminal

information in this case, it also filed under seal an extensive
12-page Affidavit of Probable Cause for the Information.
Although filed under seal in order to minimize the amount of pretrial publicity in this case, it is available to the defendant
and his counsel, and sets out in considerable detail the facts
informing the defendant of the nature and cause of the offense
charged, obviating the need for a bill of particulars under §7735-4(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
2.

The Information specifically charges the defendant,

as a party to the offense, with the offense of Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, and contains the statutory
references to both the substantive crime of murder under §76-5203(a), (b), and/or(c), U.C.A., 1953 as amended, as veil as the
statutory reference to the section dealing with criminal
responsibility for conduct of another, or -parties" section, §762-202, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
3.

In Defendant's motion he also asks for the State's

theories of murder.

Although not required under §77-35-4(e)

pertaining to a motion for bill of particulars, the Defendant has
been on notice concerning the State's legal theories since before
the preliminary hearing in this case through the State's filing
in Third Circuit Court of a document entitled "MEMORANDUM OF

AUTHORITY RE: PRINCIPLES OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILILTY AND OF LEGAL
CAUSATION."

The State is filing such memorandum again in

District Court contemporaneously with the filing of this
response.
4.

The Defendant has been fully informed of the nature

and extent of the charges against him, the factual basis
therefor, and legal principles which the State deems to be
applicable to his case.
should be denied.
DATED this

His Motion for Bill of Particulars

Hz

&^
*f~

-»-« of
~* ^ /(rV^m^*^^ f ^ w ^
day

, i|
,
1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Chief# Litigation Division
Assistant Attorney General

C^hfrffFr^ZZr
7^7^
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah

JsL

DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that I delivered a copy of the
foregoing STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT ADDAM SWAPP'S MOTION FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS to the following this
November,

1988:

John Bucher
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp
1518 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Earl Spafford
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
G. Fred Metos
Attorney for John Timothy Singer
175 East 400 South #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

i2^

day of

ADDENDUM C

DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN - 2889
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

:

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY RE:
PRINCIPLES OF ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY AND OF LEGAL
CAUSATION

t

Criminal No. 1218

j

Judge Michael R. Murphy

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
-V6-

ADDAM W. SWAPP,
JONATHAN R. SWAPP, and
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER,
Defendants.

The State of Utah, by and through Creighton C. Horton
II, Assistant Attorney General, submits the following memorandum
of law concerning principles of legal responsibility applicable
to the above-entitled case.

I. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
•Every person, acting with the mental state required
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.-

§76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

1. Aider and abettor is guilty of the natural and
reasonable or probable consequences of acts he knowingly aided or
abetted.

People v. Martinez, 48 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966);

Murphy, 489 P. 2d 430 (Utah 1971);

State v.

People v. Durham, 449 P. 2d

198 (Cal- 1969), cert, denied 23 L. Ed. 2d 755;

People v.

Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986).
2.

Aider and abettor is liable for the natural and

probable consequences of his criminal acts even if he did not
intend the result.
1982);

U.S. v. Barnett, 667 F. 2d 835 (9th Cir.

People v. Luparello, supra.
3.

Whether act committed was a natural and probable

consequence of an act encouraged and the extent of defendant's
knowledge are questions of fact for the jury.
supra;

People v. Durham,

People v. Luparello, supra,
4. Where defendants are acting in concert, immaterial

that other defendant fired fatal shot; shot fired by one fired by
all.

People, v. Bracey, 249 N.E. 2d 224 (111. 1969);

Hall v.

State, 403 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1981);

Riddick v. Comm., 308 S.E.

2d 117 (Va. 1983).
5.

Defendant is accountable for death of victim where

he embarks on course of action which was dangerous in character
and could reasonably be expected to require the use of force that
might result in the death of a human being.
356 N.E. 2d 1044 (111. 1976);

People v. Horton,

People v. Hughes, 185 N.E. 2d 834

(111. 1962).
6.

If defendant, by agreement, is in position to

render aid, he is guilty even if he does not participate in the
actual perpetration of crime.
mere onlooker.
7.

In such circumstances he is not a

Comm, v. Soares, 387 N.E. 2d 499 (Mass. 1979).

Only slight participation is required to change a

person's status from a mere spectator into an aider and abettor.
Smith v. State, 640 P. 2d 988 (Okla. App. 1982).
8.

Where a defendant deliberately engages in an affray

and deliberately uses a lethal weapon, the resulting death is
within defendant's intent as a natural and probable consequence
if the death is directly attributable to the affray and not to
some intervening cause.

Johnson v. State, 386 P. 2d 336 (Okla.

1963).
9.

Where defendant acts jointly with others bent on

illegal acts which are dangerous or homicidal in character, or
which will probably require use of force that could result in

taking like unlawfully, he becomes liable for wrongdoings of all
co-defendants acting in furtherance of common purpose, or as a
natural or probable consequence thereof, even where defendant
does not actually participate in overt acts himself.

People v.

Raybourn, 219 N.E. 2d 711 (111. 1966)
10.

One may infer common plan from facts and

circumstances, including organized conduct before and after the
killing.

People v. Younqblood, 418 N.W. 2d 472 (Mich. 1988);

People v. Stephens, 301 N.E. 2d 89 (111. 1973);
528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976).

U.S. v. James,

(Note that in James, supra, the

defendant, who was the leader of a group claiming to be an
independent foreign nation, was convicted as an aider and abettor
in the use of firearms in the commission of a felony even though
he was not present at the time the shoot-out occurred.)
11.

Jury can look at events before, during, and after

as well as actions of the parties which show a common design to
murder the victim.

Barron v. State, 566 S.W. 2d 929 (Tex. 1978);

Santana v. State, 714 S.W. 2d 1 (Tex. 1986).
12.

Where defendants took affirmative steps to arm

themselves and participate in an escape attempt, a crime
committed by one to bring about the escape was the act of all.
People v. Dennis, 284 N.E. 2d 67 (111. 1972).
13.

Where the killing of the victim was a natural and

probable consequence of a common plan, one may infer defendant's

intent to kill although a co-defendant may have done the actual
killing.

State v. Nabozny, 375 N.E. 2d 784 (Ohio 1978).
14.

Where aider and abettor's participation in

criminal acts is major and it is foreseeable that lethal force
might be used, his reckless indifference to human life is a
highly culpable mental state akin to acting intentionally for
purposes of making an Enmund-type death penalty judgment.

Tison

v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
15.

Where a defendant is a party to a compact of

criminal conduct which includes within its scope the forcible
resistance of arrest and where he is also present at the scene
for the purposes of assisting in its commission, he may be found
guilty of the murder of a police officer who is killed by an
accomplice during such joint resistance.

People v. Durham,

supra.

II.

CAUSATION

Defendants set in motion events the natural and
probable outcome of which was death.

They set the stage for a

foreseeable and tragic outcome by creating a highly volatile
situation.
They knowingly engaged in conduct that created a grave%
risk of death to another# and the circumstances under which they
acted, when viewed objectively by a reasonable person, evidenced

a depraved indifference to human life.
Annotated, 1953 as amended;

$76-5-203(c), Utah Code

State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d. 1042

(Utah 1984). (i.e. Defendants' collective armed resistance to law
enforcement authorities after bombing the church; their refusal
to allow officers onto the property despite a legal obligation to
do so after notification of outstanding search and arrest
warrants; their turning the Singer residence into an armed
fortress; their moving about the property armed with high powered
rifles and other deadly weapons; their aiming of weapons and
firing of shots [by one or more participants] in the direction of
officers during the siege.)
1.

Firing by Timothy cannot be considered an

independent intervening cause or an unforeseeable event as it
pertains to the legal liability of Addam and Jonathan Swapp.
Timothy's actions were part and parcel of the joint resistance.
Defendants' own conduct of armed resistance exhibited a conscious
disregard for life, and the victim's resulting death was highly
probable.

Hence, such conduct caused the death of the victim.

See People v. Caldwell, 681 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1984);
State, 671 P. 2d 62 (Okla. 1983);
P. 2d 659 (Cal. 1978);
1966);

Mosier v.

Pizano v. Superior Court, 577

People v. Gilbert, 408 P. 2d 365 (Cal.

People v. Claflln, 150 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979);

Velasquez, 126 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1976);
329 (Tenn. 1978).

People v.4

Jones v. State, 580 S.W. 2d

2.

Any person who initiates a battle with deadly

weapons in the course of committing another criminal offense,
intentionally and with conscious disregard for life# commits an
act that is likely to cause death.

People v. Gilbert, supra;

People v. Reed, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969);
supra;

People v. Claflin,

People v. Velasquez, supra
3.

Defendants need not fire first shot in order to

•initiate" gun battle.

People v. Reed, supra;

Washington, 402 P. 2d 130 (Cal. 1965);

People v.

Taylor v. Superior Court,

477 P. 2d 131 (Cal. 1970).
4.

A homicide that is the direct causal result of the

commission of a felony which is inherently dangerous to human
life (but not a felony within the felony-murder rule) may
constitute second degree murder.

People v. Schader, 401 P. 2d

665 (Cal. 1965).
5.

A defendant who acts in a way inherently dangerous

to human life and who causes others to act or react is guilty of
murder, as such acts are not independent intervening causes of
the killing.

Jones, v. State, supra;

Pi2ano v. Superior Court, supra;
People v. Claflin, supra;

People v. Caldwell, supra;

People v. Washington, supra;

Taylor v. Superior Court, supra;

People v. Williams, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Cal. App. 1977).
6.

Where events are a foreseeable and natural

consequence of one's criminal conduct, chain of legal causation
is unbroken.

U.S. v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1986).

7.

Defendant can be found guilty for murder committed

by accomplice, though he did not intend to commit murder, where
murder is a natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of acts
he put in motion.

People v. Luparello, supra.

DATED this

^

day of ^'I^JUIA<£L<-

, 1 988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Chief, Litigation Division
Assistant Attorney General

DAVID J./SCHWENDIMAN
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES RE: PRINCIPLES OF ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY AND OF LEGAL CAUSATION to the following this

day of

*\S

, 1988:

John R. Bucher
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp
1518 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Earl Spafford
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
G. Fred Metos
Attorney for John Timothy Singer
175 East 400 South #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

SUMMARY DECISION
CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

1218

vs.
ADDAM W. SWAPP, JOHN TIMOTHY
SINGER, and JONATHAN SWAPP,
Defendants.

The court took under advisement and requested briefs on the
issue of the courtfs discretion under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah
Code Ann., to apply consecutive sentences.
Upon consideration of the briefs submitted, the court hereby
rules

that

the

prohibition

of

aggregate

minimum

sentences

exceeding 12 years in Section 76-3-401(4) is not applicable when
the sentence of the first sentencing court is a determinate
sentence.

See People v. Dye, 69 111.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630, 633-

34 (1977).
The

sentences

of

each

defendant

in

Federal

Court were

determinate sentences and were not rendered otherwise by the
federal

statute

allowing

good

time.

The

sentences

to

be

considered under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Ann., are those
actually imposed by the first sentencing court and not the range
of terms which the first sentencing court has as alternatives
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prior to imposition of a determinate sentence.
these sentences are not to be considered

Consequently,

in determining the

aggregate minimum sentences under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code
Ann.
While the court is of the view that a proper consideration
of the federal sentencing scheme resolves the issue concerning
aggregate minimums, further comment and construction of Section
76-3-401(4) is appropriate.
In determining whether consecutive sentences may and should
be imposed, a court is governed by Subsections 76-3-401(l)-(3),
which

set

consecutive

forth

the

authority

sentences.

and

factors

for

imposing

The first phrase of Subsection 76-3-

401(4) expressly indicates that it is invoked only if the court
has

already

sentences."

"lawfully

determined

to

impose

consecutive

The succeeding language concerning limitations on

aggregate minimums and aggregate maximums, then, does not limit
the

courtfs

discretion

in imposing

consecutive

merely dictates the effect of such sentences.
the

federal

sentences

sentences but

For example, if

in this case had to be considered in

calculating aggregate minimums under Subsection 76-3-401(4), one
alternative effect of a consecutive 1 to 15 year state sentence
could be that it would begin to run concurrent with the federal
sentence after the eleventh year.
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While the court need not address such issues in this case#
it is clear that Subsection 76-3-401(4) addresses the effect of
consecutive sentences and does not prohibit consecutive sentences
when

the

aggregate

minimum

imposition of a consecutive

is

exceeded

sentence.

by

reason

of

the

This construction of

Subsection 76-3-401(4) is consistent with the directions to the
Board of Pardons in Subsection 76-3-401(6) in "determining the
effect of consecutive sentences,"

(Emphasis added).

If any of the defendants view the construction of Subsection
76-3-401(4) in this Summary Decision to be erroneous and its
effect is the imposition of an unlawful sentence, their remedy is
a direct appeal at this time.

Absent a contrary construction of

the statute by subsequent binding precedent, the doctrine of res
judicata and the law of the case will require any other judge of
this court to deny a request to correct any of the sentences
under Section 77-35-22(e), Utah Code Ann., whether presented by
the Board of Pardons, a motion by a defendant in this case or
collateral attack.

Furthermore, if not challenged now by direct

appeal, it is arguable that a challenge hereafter under Section
77-35-22(e) has been waived.
Dated this

26th

day of January, 1989.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
this

26th

Summary Decision,

day of January, 1989:

Creighton C. Horton II
David J. Schwendiman
Assistant Attorneys General
23 6 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
John R, Bucher
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp
1518 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Earl Spafford
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
G. Fred Metos
Attorney for John Timothy Singer
175 East 400 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to the following,

ADDENDUM E

R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. SCHWENDIMAN - 2889
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

: JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT
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:

Case No. 1218

:

Judge Michael R. Murphy

ADDAM W. SWAPP,
Defendant.

On December 22, 1988, the Defendant, Addam W. Swapp,
was -found guilty by a jury of the offense of Manslaughter, a
Second Degree Felony, a lesser included offense of that charged
in the Information, and the Court adjudged the Defendant guilty
of that offense.

At the request of the Court, counsel for the State and
for the Defendant submitted sentencing memoranda, and on January
19/ 1989, a sentencing hearing was held before the Court.
Defendant was present and represented by counsel, John Bucher.
The State was represented by Creighton C. Horton II, Assistant
Attorney General, and by David J. Schwendiman, Special Assistant
Attorney General. After the hearing, sentencing was continued
for one week pending the submission of additional memoranda by
counsel for the State and for the Defendant.
On January 26, 1989, Defendant was present before the
Court and represented by counsel, John Bucher.

The State was

represented by Creighton C. Horton II, Assistant Attorney
General, and by David J. Schwendiman, Special Assistant Attorney
General.

The Court, having disposed of all legal issues and

having rendered its Sentencing Decision and Order on January 26,
1989, hereby makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence
and Commitment:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, Addam W. Swapp, has been convicted and is guilty of
the crime of Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, a lesser
included offense of that charged in the Information.

The Court

having asked whether there was any legal or other reason why
sentence should not be imposed, and no sufficient cause to the
contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged
that the Defendant is guilty of Manslaughter, a Second Degree
Felony.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the Defendant be
confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a term of
not less than one year nor more than 15 years as provided by law
for the crime of Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, which term
shall run consecutively to and at the end of any and all
determinate sentences imposed in United States v. Addam W. Swapp,
Case No. 88-CR-006J, United States District Court for the
District of Utah, with the limitation, however, that, in
accordance with Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, the aggregate maximum term of all sentences imposed in
this case and the above-referenced federal case shall in no event
exceed thirty (30) years.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be given
credit for time served in state custody since the execution of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum in this case to the
extent credit therefor is not applied to the Defendant's sentence

in the the above-referenced federal case; the determination of
the amount of credit due, if any,

shall be made by the Board of

Pardons consistent with this order and the Court's Sentencing
Decision and Order of January 26, 1989.

COMMITMENT
IT IS ORDERED that, at the time the Defendant, Addam W.
Swapp, is released from federal custody, the Sheriff of Summit
County or his authorized representative shall deliver said
defendant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah,
where he shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in
accordance with the above Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.

DATED this Zjr^ day of

yiA^uA^^i
Qduuc*^

4-

, 1989.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
4ICHJ
District
Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT to the following
this

day of

, 1989:

John R. Bucher
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp
1518 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Creighton
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

C. Horton II
Attorney General
Capitol
City, Utah 84114

